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Abstract
■ This study investigated the brain regions for the com-
prehension of implied emotion in sentences. Participants read
negative sentences without negative words, for example, “The
boy fell asleep and never woke up again,” and their neutral
counterparts “The boy stood up and grabbed his bag.” This
kind of negative sentence allows us to examine implied emo-
tion derived at the sentence level, without associative emotion
coming from word retrieval. We found that implied emotion
in sentences, relative to neutral sentences, led to activation in
some emotion-related areas, including the medial prefrontal cor-
tex, the amygdala, and the insula, as well as certain language-
related areas, including the inferior frontal gyrus, which has
been implicated in combinatorial processing. These results sug-
gest that the emotional network involved in implied emotion
is intricately related to the network for combinatorial processing
in language, supporting the view that sentence meaning is more
than simply concatenating the meanings of its lexical build-
ing blocks. ■
INTRODUCTION
We read, and oftentimes we feel emotional when we
read. How does the brain gather emotion from language
during reading? There are several ways that emotion can
be induced by language. One straightforward way is
through word associations, including words associated
with emotions (e.g., sad, happy) and words associated
with emotionally significant events (e.g., assassinate). Past
research has shown that these words lead to activations
in a range of brain regions, including amygdala, para-
hippocampal and lingual gyrus, cingulate cortex, and visual
areas (Moseley, Carota, Hauk, Mohr, & Pulvermuller, 2012;
Herbert et al., 2009; Isenberg et al., 1999). Another way
language induces emotion is less straightforward. In our
daily life, we understand not only emotion explicitly stated
in words but also emotion implied by a series of neutral
words. For example, in the sentence “The boy fell asleep
and never woke up again,” the unpleasant emotion is
not explicitly stated, but the sentence triggers negative
feelings—that is, the emotion is implied. This study is
interested in how the brain supports the computation of
implied emotion in language. Specifically, we ask two
questions: First, would implied emotion engage brain
regions involved in explicit, associative emotion? Second,
would implied emotion influence areas supportive of
language comprehension?
In what follows, we first review the regions commonly
reported for emotion and then for language. Most emotion
studies used pictures, and based on the pictorial modality,
the regions commonly reported for emotion include the
amygdala, themedial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the anterior
cingulate gyrus, and the insula (Luan Phan, Wager, Taylor, &
Liberzon, 2004). Different functional roles have been pro-
posed for these regions. Amygdala responds to emotionally
arousing information, including both negative emotions
such as fear and threat (Davis &Whalen, 2001) and positive
emotions such as happiness (Hamann & Mao, 2002). The
mPFC has been argued to play a general role for many
kinds of emotions across various stimulus formats (Lane,
Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997) and is related
to the cognitive generation and regulation of affect
(Teasdale et al., 1999), as well as introspective mental ac-
tivities (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001).
Moreover, this region and its subregions have been dis-
cussed in the research contexts of social cognition and the-
ory of mind. In particular, the anterior region of the rostral
medial frontal cortex has been implicated in the evaluation
of one’s own emotion, the perception and judgment about
other people, and the ability to represent another person’s
psychological perspective (Amodio & Frith, 2006). The last
function is also known as “mentalizing”—that is, the ability
to predict someone else’s mental state based on their own
belief and the emotional impact of the belief (Frith & Frith,
2006). Closely related to the mPFC/medial frontal cortex
is the ACC. It has been proposed that the dorsal ACC
and mPFC are involved in cognitively generated emotional
responses, whereas the ventral portions of ACC and mPFC
play more of a regulatory role for emotional responses
(Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011). The insula is another
region that is commonly observed in emotion studies.
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The insula has been implicated for internally generated
emotion, but not so much for externally induced emotion
via pictures (Reiman et al., 1997). One proposal suggested
that the insula is a somatic marker that maps our bodily
states to the associated emotional experiences (Damasio,
Everitt, & Bishop, 1996; but see Dunn, Dalgleish, &
Lawrence, 2006). Another proposal suggested that the
insula plays an important role in social emotion, such as
empathy and compassion (Lamm & Singer, 2010), and
serves as an interface that integrates several functional
systems involved in affect, sensory-motor processing, and
cognition (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013).
Words differ from pictures in that words represent a
type of emotional event indirectly, whereas pictures de-
pict the specifics, representing a token of the emotional
event of interest directly. Several studies have examined
emotional words, but to date there is no clear consensus
as to which regions are definitely involved. Amygdala
involvement has been reported in some (Strange, Henson,
Friston, & Dolan, 2000; Isenberg et al., 1999), but not
others (Kuchinke et al., 2005; Cato et al., 2004). Within
those that found amygdala involvement, they also found
that amygdala modulated the visual processing of emotion-
ally valenced words in the occipital cortex (e.g., Tabert
et al., 2001). In those that did not show amygdalar re-
sponses, some observed activation in the posterior cin-
gulate cortex instead (Kuchinke et al., 2005; Maddock,
Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003), whereas others observed
activation in the left inferior frontal cortex instead (Nakic,
Smith, Busis, Vythilingam, & Blair, 2006). These mixed
findings may be driven by task: The more evaluative the
task is, the more likely it is to find amygdala activation.
At the sentence level, only a couple of studies have
examined emotion and explicit emotion. In a lesion study,
Adolphs, Russell, and Tranel (1999) examined the func-
tional role of the amygdala in a rare patient with bilateral
amygdala damage. The patient was presented with sen-
tences such as “Sally waved her hands in the air and
yelled for help, as the boat was sinking.” The patient was
impaired in judging how emotionally arousing these
sentences were but was intact in judging whether the
sentences were pleasant or unpleasant. Moll, de Oliveira-
Souza, Bramati, and Grafman (2002) examined moral
statements. Relevant to this study, within their nonmoral
sentences, enhanced activities were observed for the un-
pleasant relative to the neutral statements in the left amyg-
dala, orbital frontal cortex, lingual gyri, and fusiform areas.
Holt et al. (2011) examined the comprehension of emo-
tional descriptions in schizophrenia and healthy controls.
Negative relative to neutral sentences in healthy partici-
pants showed activations in the right posterior cingulate
gyrus, right precuneus, and left posterior cingulate gyrus.
Finally, Willems, Clevis, and Hagoort (2011) found that
emotional sentences compared to nonemotional sen-
tences showed more activation in the left insula, the left
temporal pole, and the anterior part of the left inferior
frontal region.
Holt et al. (2011), Moll et al. (2002), and Adolphs et al.
(1999) used emotional sentences that contain emotional
words (e.g., yelled, sinking), providing word associations
with explicit emotion. In strong contrast and crucially,
this study used emotional sentences without emotionally
valenced words, aiming at investigating the neurobiolog-
ical underpinnings of the computation of implied emo-
tion. We suggest that implied emotion in sentences
require “combinatorial processing.” Combinatorial pro-
cessing in language refers to the process in which words
are combined into multiword representations to give rise
to sentential meaning beyond the meaning of single
words (Hagoort, 2013; Humphries, Binder, Medler, &
Liebenthal, 2007; Hagoort, 2005). Combinatorial process-
ing is assumed to happen at multiple levels, such as
sound, syntax, and meaning (Jackendoff, 2002). To test
emotion generated by combinatorial processing and
combinatorial processing alone, we designed negative
sentences that contain no negative words (e.g., “The
boy fell asleep and never woke up again”) and their
neutral counterparts (“The boy stood up and grabbed
his bag”). In both the negative and neutral sentences,
none of the individual lexical items are associated with
negative feelings, but the negative sentence as a whole
triggers negative feelings, whereas the neutral sentence
does not.
Most language studies examining combinatorial pro-
cessing of this kind reported enhanced activations in the
regions of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG), the ante-
rior and posterior temporal regions, and the angular
gyrus (Brennan & Pylkkänen, 2012; Rodd, Johnsrude, &
Davis, 2012; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011; Graves, Binder,
Desai, Conant, & Seidenberg, 2010; Snijders et al., 2009;
Humphries et al., 2007; Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005).
Activations in the LIFG have been reliably found for various
types of stimuli, ranging from simple combinations such
as two-word compounds (e.g., meaningful “flower girl”
vs. reversed “girl flower”; Graves et al., 2010) to complex
combinations in multiword utterances (e.g., sentences
with ambiguous words “The shell was fired towards the
tank” vs. sentences with unambiguous words “Her secrets
were written in her diary”; Rodd et al., 2005). Several
hypotheses have been put forth for the functional role
of LIFG during language processing: The LIFGmay contrib-
ute to the parsing and reparsing of syntactic information
(Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005), the reinter-
pretation of semantic information (Rodd et al., 2012), and
the integration of information that is not stored in long-
term memory (Hagoort, 2005, 2013; Willems, Ozyurek, &
Hagoort, 2007). The LIFG can be anatomically subdivided
into pars orbitalis, pars opercularis, and pars triangularis,
each of which has been implicated in the subprocesses
in language processing (Hagoort, 2005). Specifically, the
dorsal parts of the LIFG (pars triangularis and pars opercu-
laris) are implicated in syntactic processing, and the ventral
parts of the LIFG (pars triangularis and pars orbitalis) are
implicated in semantic processing (Hagoort & Indefrey,
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2014). In addition, pars opercularis has been shown to be
involved in phonological processing (Hagoort, 2013).
Not all language theories would support the claim that
emotion can be derived from combinatorial language
processing. According to a strong version of the embod-
ied theories, emotional language is grounded in the
emotional states of the body, and simulating those is a
prerequisite for language comprehension (Glenberg,
Havas, Becker, & Rinck, 2005). In support of this view,
it has been shown that emotional words such as weep ac-
tivate motor areas, suggesting that emotional word mean-
ing is understood through simulating emotion-expressing
actions previously experienced (Moseley et al., 2012).
However, most of these studies examined emotion as-
sociated with words, not emotion derived from word
combinations in sentences. It is not clear if the emotion-
by-simulation theories can account for implied emotion
at the sentence level, which cannot come from word re-
trieval, but must stem from combinatorial processing in
sentences. In addition, some studies (e.g., Moseley et al.,
2012; Kuchinke et al., 2005) also found activations for
emotional words in classic language regions such as
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), typically implicated for com-
binatorial language processing.
This study examines the comprehension of implied
emotion in sentences. To this end, we measured hemo-
dynamic changes while participants read negative sentences
without negative words (e.g., The boy fell asleep and never
woke up again), negative words (e.g., coma), and negative
pictures (e.g., a picture of a man being bullied), along with
their neutral counterparts. We added the conditions of
words and pictures because, although our primary interest
is sentences, we are also interested in the commonalities
and differences between words, pictures, and sentences.
We predict that implied emotion, as revealed by subtract-
ing the neutral sentences from the negative sentences, will
likely lead to activation in the mPFC, the amygdala, and the
insula, because implied emotion tested here can be viewed
as an internally produced, high-level cognitive representa-
tion of emotion. In addition, we may also observe enhanced
activations in LIFG because of its role in combinatorial pro-
cessing (Hagoort, 2005, 2013), as well as other language-
relevant regions in the temporal cortex, the ventromedial
pFC, and/or the angular gyrus (Friederici, 2012; Poeppel,
Emmorey, Hickok, & Pylkkänen, 2012). Moreover, implied
emotion or, more generally speaking, implied meaning
can also be computed via inferential processing. Inferential
processing is related to combinatorial processing as both
compute meaning beyond the single word level.1 We
view combinatorial processing as a necessity for language,
whereas inferential processing is available when called upon
by communicative needs, which is often the case during
language communication. Several studies have shown that
inferring the speaker meaning involves the theory of mind
network including the TPJ and the mPFC (Bašnáková,
Weber, Petersson, van Berkum, & Hagoort, 2014; Hagoort
2013; van Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, &
Rueschemeyer, 2012; Kuperberg, Lakshmanan, Caplan, &
Holcomb, 2006).
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four native Dutch speakers participated in the
study for payment. Eight were excluded for the following
reasons: Two did not fit the language criterion of being
a native speaker of Dutch, two had noncorrected vision
during the experiment, and four had too much movement
during scanning (>3.5 mm). The remaining 16 partici-
pants (14 women,2 mean age = 20.5 years, range = 18–
28 years) were right-handed, as assessed by the Dutch
version of the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield,
1971). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and none had a history of neurological, psychiatric, or
language disorder problems. None was particularly de-
pressed or happy, as assessed by the Positive Affect Negative
Affect System Trait questionnaire (Watson, 1988; positive
affect = 3.59, SD = 0.34, range = 3.1–4.0, on a scale from
1 to 5; negative affect = 1.87, SD = 0.44, range = 1.3–2.7).
The study fell under the legal ethical approval procedure
in the Netherlands. Before the experiment, each partici-
pant signed an informed consent and was told that they
could stop their participation any time.
Materials
The materials consisted of 140 pairs of negative/neutral
sentences (Table 1), 140 pairs of negative/neutral words
(Table 1), and 140 pairs of negative/neutral scenes. We
constructed the sentences from scratch and selected words
based on the Dutch Affective Word norm database (Moors
et al., 2013) and the word frequency database SubtLex-NL
(Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010). The semantic content
of the words and sentences are matched, but not with
the pictures. We selected pictures from the International
Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2008) and from the Internet because of the lack of animate
beings in the International Affective Picture System neutral
images. Several norming tests were carried out to verify
the manipulated content and the quality of materials
detailed below.
For verifying the emotional manipulations of all mate-
rials, 41 additional participants who did not take part in
the scanning session participated in the computerized
pretests for sentences (13 participants), words (13 partici-
pants), and pictures (15 participants). Participants rated
each stimulus on their valence, arousal, and concreteness
dimensions by clicking on a 9-point Self-Assessment Mani-
kin scale, adapted from Bradley and Lang (1994), a rating
scheme typically used in emotion research. The emotional
scale ranged from a frowning manikin at the negative end
(=1) to a neutral-faced manikin in the middle (=5) and
a smiling manikin on the right (=9). Likewise, the arousal
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scale ranged from a nonarousing manikin on one end (=1)
to a more arousing manikin in the middle (=5) and a very
arousing manikin on the right (=9). The concreteness
scale ranged from concrete (=1) to abstract (=9).
The rating results are summarized in Table 2. Overall,
negative items are indeed more negatively valenced than
neutral items for sentences, words, and pictures, with
similar negative-neutral difference between sentences,
words, and pictures. Paired t tests indicated that, in sen-
tences, the negative sentences were more negative than
the neutral ones (t(12) = 19.796, p< .0001), more arous-
ing than the neutral ones (t(12) = 5.022, p < .0001), and
as concrete as the neutral ones (t(12) = 1.172, p = .264).
For words, the negative words were more negative than
the neutral ones (t(12) = 12.041, p< .0001), more arous-
ing than the neutral ones (t(12) = 7.321, p < .0001), and
as concrete as the neutral ones (t(12) = 1.664, p = .122).
In pictures, the negative scenes were more negative than
the neutral ones (t(14) = 14.749, p< .0001), more arous-
ing than the neutral ones (t(14) = 8.917, p < .0001), and
as concrete as the neutral ones (t(14) = 1.050, p = .311).
Crucially, for sentences, we made sure that (1) the words
in the negative and neutral sentences were matched
in terms of the emotional characteristics and nonemo-
tional features at the single word level, so that all emotional
meaning came from combinations of words and not from
Table 2. Pretest Ratings of Valence, Arousal, and Concreteness for Negative and Neutral Sentences, Words, and Pictures on a
9-Point Scale
Sentences: Whole Sentence,
Mean (SD)
Sentences: Content Words,
Mean (SD)
Words,
Mean (SD)
Pictures,
Mean (SD)
Valence Negative 2.36 (0.5) 4.40 (0.32) 2.38 (0.5) 2.38 (0.6)
Neutral 5.22 (0.2) 4.47 (0.36) 5.48 (0.6) 5.16 (0.4)
Arousal Negative 5.59 (1.1) 4.16 (0.36) 5.62 (1.1) 5.90 (1.8)
Neutral 3.11 (1.5) 4.18 (0.45) 2.71 (1.4) 1.95 (0.9)
Concreteness Negative 6.41 (1.1) – 6.37 (1.2) 6.58 (1.1)
Neutral 6.20 (1.3) – 6.72 (1.3) 6.79 (1.2)
Table 1. Examples of Negative/Neutral Sentences/Words in Dutch with English Translations Provided in Quotes
Eg. Condition Sentences Words
1 Negative Ze kwam uit het water en zag dat er een zwart beest vastgezogen zat aan haar been. bloedzuiger
“She came out of the water and saw a black animal attached on her leg.” “leech”
Neutral Ze ging naar de keuken en zag dat er een paddenstoel klaargelegd was op het aanrecht. champignons
“She went into the kitchen and saw some mushrooms laid on the counter.” “mushrooms”
2 Negative De man zag een rood spoor op de vloer en zag zijn vrouw in de gang liggen. bloedsporen
“The man saw a red trace on the floor and saw his wife lying in the hallway.” “blood traces”
Neutral De man bekeek de stadswandeling op de kaart en zag het oude gebouw op de hoek liggen. monumenten
“The man checked the citywalk on the map and saw the old building lying at the corner.” “monuments”
3 Negative Hij heeft nog maar één been en nu moet deze ook verwijderd worden. amputatie
“He has only one leg and now this one must also be removed.” “amputation”
Neutral Hij heeft nog maar één bord en nu moeten er meer gekocht worden. aardewerk
“He has only one plate so now more must be purchased.” “pottery”
4 Negative Er kropen honderden beestjes over haar benen die hun tanden in haar vlees zetten. insectenbeet
“Hundreds of small animals were crawling on her legs and were putting their teeth into
her flesh.”
“insect bite”
Neutral Er reden honderden auto’s over de weg waarvan de achterste lampen op het wegdek schenen. achterlichten
“Hundreds of cars were driving on the road of which the rear lights were shining on the road” “tail lights”
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words themselves; (2) the negative and neutral sentences
were matched in terms of their nonemotional implied
meanings, so that the inferential processing was matched
between conditions; and (3) the negative and neutral
sentences differed in terms of their emotional implied
meanings.
Regarding (1), we matched the mean valence, arousal,
and word frequencies of the content words of the sen-
tences between conditions. We ensured this by first finding
the valence and arousal values of all of the content words in
the sentences based on the Dutch Affective Word norm
database (Moors et al., 2013), averaging the values of the
content words of a given sentence and matching the aver-
ages between the conditions. In this norm, the rating scale
ranges from 1 to 7 (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive;
1 = very calm and 7 = very arousing). The averaged
valence ratings were 4.4 (SD = 0.3, range = 3.5–4.9) for
the content words in the negative sentences and 4.5 (SD =
0.4, range = 3.4–5.8) in the neutral sentences ( p = .998).
The averaged arousal ratings were 4.2 (SD = 0.4, range =
3.2–4.8) for the content words in the negative sentences
and 4.2 (SD = 0.5, range = 3.1–5.1) for the content words
in the neutral sentences ( p= .926). We consulted Keuleers
et al. (2010) for word frequency values. The averaged log
frequencies of the content words were 2.3 (SD = 0.4) for
the negative sentences and 2.2 (SD = 0.4) for the neutral
sentences ( p = .389).
Regarding (2), the nonemotional implied meaning and
animacy were assessed by two native Dutch-speaking
research assistants. One of the assistants first wrote down
for each sentence what the nonemotional implied mean-
ing was. For example, for a sentence such as “The window
was open and the paper on the desk fell to the floor,” the
research assistant wrote down “There was wind,” as the
nonemotional implied meaning. The other then rated
whether the generated nonemotional implied meaning
was emotional (=1) or nonemotional (=0). The averaged
ratings were 0.02 (SD = 0.15) for the negative and 0.08
(SD = 0.3) for the neutral sentences, with the difference
being nonsignificant ( p = .09).3 For animacy, both assis-
tants judged whether there was anything animate in a
given sentence (1 = yes, 0 = no). The averaged scores
for animacy were 1.0 (SD = 0.2) for the negative and 0.9
(SD = 0.2) for the neutral sentences ( p = .741). The
assistants also discussed and made sure that the syntactic
structures are matched. The sentence length was mea-
sured both in terms of the number of letters and words.
The averaged numbers of letters were 78.4 (SD= 15.2) for
the negative and 80.6 (SD= 17.4) for the neutral sentences
( p = .424), and the averaged numbers of words were 14.9
(SD = 3.1) for the negative and 14.7 (SD = 3.0) for the
neutral sentences.
Regarding (3), two research assistants generated one
sentence that they considered to represent the implied
meaning for each sentence. Then, 15 participants rated
whether those generated sentences were negative on a
1–7 scale (1 = negative, 4 = neutral, 7 = positive).
On average, implied meanings generated from the nega-
tive sentences were rated 1.80 (SD = 0.31) and implied
meanings generated from the neutral sentences were
rated 4.53 (SD = 0.59). This difference was statistically
significant ( p < .0001), confirming our manipulation.
Additionally, 20 nonsense sentences (e.g., The patch
will gladly reveal against a watery involved magic.),
20 nonwords, and 20 pictures with a black dot somewhere
in the picture were created as the catch trials.
Procedure
Participants were debriefed and signed an informed con-
sent form before entering the scanner room and lying
down in the scanner. Each participant did three runs
(Figure 1), with the anatomical scan and breaks in be-
tween runs. In Run 1, 70 negative sentences, 70 neutral
sentences, and 20 nonsense sentences were presented in
randomized order via the Presentation software (Neuro-
behavioral Systems, Inc., www.nbs.com). In each trial, a
fixation sign “+” was presented for 500 msec to signal
the upcoming sentence. The presentation duration of a
given sentence was length dependent (the number of
words × 500 msec) if the number of words in a sentence
was ≤8. If the number of words was >8, the sentence
was presented for 4000 msec. Between trials, a black
screen was presented with the intertrial interval varying
from 2.5 sec to 5.5 sec (mean = 4 sec within a participant)
to effectively jitter trial onset with respect to volume
acquisition (Dale, 1999).
In Run 2, 70 negative words, 70 neutral words, and
20 nonwords were presented in random order. The trial
structure was the same as Run 1 except for the presen-
tation duration of the stimulus word. If the word length
was ≤8 letters, the word was presented for (the number
of letters × 50) msec. If the length was >8 letters, the
word was presented for 1500 msec. In Run 3, 70 negative
pictures, 70 neutral pictures, 10 negative pictures with
a black dot, and 10 neutral pictures with a black dot were
presented in random order. The trial structure was the
same as Runs 1 and 2, except for the presentation dura-
tion of the stimulus picture (2.5 sec).
Participants were instructed to read/view the sentences/
words/pictures attentively and only press a button when
the sentence did not make sense, when the word was
not a real word, and when a black dot appeared some-
where in the picture. Participants had four practice trials
before the run, with materials not used in the actual
experiment. After the scanning, a short exit interview
was conducted to verify if the experiment went well, for
example, double-checking if the participants could see
the sentences well.
fMRI Data Acquisition
EPIs covering the whole brain were acquired with an eight-
channel head coil on a Siemens MR system with a magnetic
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field strength of 1.5 T (repetition time = 2340 msec; echo
time = 35 msec; flip angle = 90°). Each volume consisted
of 32 transversal slices. The voxel size was 3.3 mm ×
3.3 mm × 3.5 mm. Additionally, a high-resolution T1-
weighted anatomical scan of the head was taken (repeti-
tion time = 2250 msec; echo time = 2.95 msec; 1 mm
isocubic voxel size).
fMRI Data Analysis
Data were analyzed with Statistical Parametric Mapping 8
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Preprocessing
involved realignment through rigid body registration to
correct for head motion and correction for differences
in slice timing acquisition to the onset of the first slice.
Subsequently, for each participant the anatomical scan
was normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
space, and normalization parameters were applied to
all functional (EPI) images. Functional data were inter-
polated to 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxel size and spatially
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 8 mm
FWHM. First-level analysis involved estimation of beta
weights in a multiple regression analysis with regressors
describing the expected hemodynamic responses (Friston
et al., 1995) for each of the conditions (Sentence_negative,
sentence_neutral, word_negative, word_neutral, picture_
negative, picture_neutral). Stimuli were modeled as their
actual duration, and regressors were convolved with a
canonical two gamma hemodynamic response function
(e.g., Friston, Holmes, Poline, Price, & Frith, 1996). The
six motion parameters obtained from the motion correc-
tion algorithm (three translations and three rotations) were
included as regressors of no interest. Second-level group
analysis involved testing a mixed model with participants
as a random factor (“random effects analysis”; Friston,
Holmes, Price, Buchel, & Worsley, 1999). Group statistical
maps were corrected for multiple comparisons by com-
bining an activation level threshold of p < .001 at the in-
dividual participant level with a cluster extent threshold
computed using the theory of Gaussian random fields to
arrive at a statistical threshold with a p < .05 significance
level, corrected for multiple comparisons (Poline, Worsley,
Evans, & Friston, 1997; Friston et al., 1996).
ROI Analysis
To understand implied emotion and how it may be related
to combinatorial processing and/or motor simulation, we
assessed responses from the IFG including its three sub-
divisions, pars opercularis, pars triangularis, and pars
orbitalis, and motor regions including motor cortex and
premotor cortex (Eickhoff et al., 2005). We created these
ROIs by using the automated anatomical labeling tem-
plate based on a landmark-guided parcellation of the
MNI template (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
We additionally carried out ROI analyses for typical emo-
tion regions, including amygdala, mPFC, and insula. The
ROIs for amygdala and mPFC were anatomically defined.
As for the ROI for the anterior insula, because the insula
comprises a very large part of the cortex and different sub-
parts of the insula are known to be differently involved in
cognitive processing, this ROI was created on the basis of
an extensive meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies investi-
gating emotional processing (Kober et al., 2008). The
Figure 1. Illustration of the
negative sentences, words, and
pictures in each of the runs.
Lai, Willems, and Hagoort 1533
mean coordinates of the maxima described in the meta-
analysis were taken for the left and right insula separately
(Kober et al., 2008; Table 3). The left insula coordinates
[x y z] are [−28 6−22], [−40 24−6], [−34 12−10], [−40
10 −20], and the right insula coordinates are [42 24 −8],
[40 4 −14], [44 16 −2]. The ROIs were spheres with the
mean coordinates for each hemisphere as center (L: −36
13 −15, R: 42 15 −8), with a 10-mm radius.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
The accuracies for the catch trials were 99.1% (SD= 2.0%)
for sentences in Run 1, 100% (SD = 0) for words in Run 2,
and 99.1% (SD = 3.8%) for pictures in Run 3.
Whole-brain Analysis Results
Sentences
Comparing negative versus neutral sentences revealed
increased activation in a large cluster stretching from the
left insular cortex to the hippocampus including the amyg-
dala (Figure 2; Table 3). A similar but less extended cluster
of activation was also observed in the right hemisphere.
Bilateral activation of the middle temporal gyrus, the
Table 3. Whole-brain (Corrected): Negative versus Neutral
Sentences (Significance Level p < .05, Corrected)
Sentences x y z T
Negative > Neutral
R Insula 26 10 −10 5.49
28 12 −22 3.2
LR medial superior frontal gyrus −2 38 42 7.12
−2 54 30 7.22
−14 46 24 6.51
LR amygdala −30 2 −22 6.32
24 −12 −8 5.51
L insula −30 18 −4 3.6
LR middle temporal gyrus −54 −30 −8 4.91
56 −36 0 3.85
R inferior frontal gyrus 54 26 −2 5.66
L precuneus −8 −60 30 5.26
Neutral > Negative
R superior frontal sulcus 28 2 62 4.64
Figure 2. Activations for the
negative > neutral contrast in
sentences (yellow), words (red),
and pictures (blue) and their
overlap (green). All activations
are corrected for multiple
comparisons as described in the
Methods section ( p < .05).
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medial superior frontal gyrus (mPFC), the left precuneus,
and the right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG) were observed.
The opposite contrast (neutral > negative) only revealed
one cluster of activation in the right superior frontal
sulcus.
Words
Comparing negative versus neutral words revealed one
cluster of activation in the left medial superior frontal
gyrus (mPFC; Figure 2; Table 4). The opposite contrast
(neutral > negative) did not reveal any activation.
Pictures
Comparing negative versus neutral pictures led to wide-
spread bilateral activation in the limbic system, including
the amygdalae, stretching into the temporal poles (Fig-
ure 2; Table 5). Another cluster of activation was found
in the bilateral fusiform gyrus, stretching into the inferior
and posterior middle temporal cortices. Additionally,
clusters of activation were observed in both LIFG and
RIFG, with the cluster on the right being much larger
than that on the left. The opposite contrast (neutral >
negative) showed a set of brain regions some of which
have been implicated as part of the default mode net-
work, including the bilateral superior parietal cortex,
bilateral posterior insula, posterior cingulated cortex, and
bilateral anterior middle frontal sulci.
Conjunction Analysis Results
We next performed a conjunction analysis, testing for
regions involved in negative > neutral in all three modali-
ties (i.e., Sentence negative > Sentence neutral ∩ Picture
negative > Picture neutral ∩ Word negative > Word neu-
tral). We tested for the so-called conjunction null (Nichols,
Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005), in which each
statistical map is thresholded at p < .05 corrected, using
the correction procedure described above. This revealed
one area of activation in the medial superior frontal gyrus
(mPFC; MNI peak voxel −6 49 32; Figure 3).
ROI Analysis Results
Inferior Frontal Cortex
We examined inferior frontal cortex and its subdivisions
of pars opercularis, pars triangularis, and pars orbitalis,
bilaterally, for sentences and for words. The results are
summarized in Figure 4. Mean activation level indicated by
beta weights was extracted and entered into a repeated-
measures ANOVA of 2 Conditions (negative, neutral) ×
2 Hemispheres (left, right) × 3 Locations (pars opercularis,
pars triangularis, pars orbitalis). In sentences, there was
a Condition × Location interaction [F(2, 30) = 5.001, p =
.026] with no hemisphere interaction (F < 1). Negative
sentences showed more activation than neutral sentences
in pars orbitalis [F(1, 15) = 16.413, p = .001] and pars
triangularis [F(1, 15) = 9.445, p = .008], but not in pars
Table 4. Whole-brain (Corrected): Negative versus Neutral
Words (Significance Level p < .05, Corrected)
Words x y z T
Negative > Neutral
L medial superior frontal gyrus −8 50 32 4.47
Neutral > Negative
– – – – –
Table 5. Whole-brain (Corrected): Negative versus Neutral
Pictures (Significance Level p < .05, Corrected)
Pictures x y z T
Negative > Neutral
LR amydalae, stretching into the
temporal poles
−22 −6 −16 6
−35 0 −28 3.8
20 −4 −16 7.14
44 16 −32 5.87
LR inferior frontal gyrus 52 28 0 4.88
50 14 28 4.35
−42 28 8 3.92
LR fusiform gyrus −44 −48 −16 6.58
44 −44 −14 7.11
LR inferior temporal sulcus −42 −74 −4 4.64
40 −72 −10 5.64
LR posterior middle temporal
gyrus
46 −68 8 5.1
−44 −70 8 4.59
L medial superior frontal gyrus −4 56 32 6.3
Neutral > Negative
LR posterior insula −43 −21 12 4.5
50 −56 46 8.3
LR superior parietal sulcus −48 −56 46 6.55
50 −54 46 9.21
Posterior cingulated cortex −4 −77 46 5.35
0 −34 34 7.41
LR middle frontal sulcus 30 56 6 6.57
−30 50 8 5.69
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opercularis [F(1, 15) = 1.87, p = .192]. For words, there
was no significant effect.
Motor Areas
We examined motor areas including motor cortex (BA 4)
and premotor cortex (BA 6). Repeated-measures ANOVAs
of 2 Condition × 2 Hemisphere revealed no Condition ×
Hemisphere interaction or any main effect of condition,
neither in motor (F < 1) nor in premotor areas (F < 1),
for both sentences and words.
Emotion Network
We carried out focused analyses for sentences and words
in the following ROIs: amygdala, mPFC, and insula. The
results are summarized in Figure 5. In amygdala, for
sentences, a repeated-measures ANOVA of 2 Condition ×
2 Hemisphere revealed a main effect of condition [F(1,
15) = 16.12, p < .001]. The amygdala was more acti-
vated for negative than neutral sentences in both hemi-
spheres [left: F(1, 15) = 18.45, p < .001; right: F(1,
15) = 8.37, p < .01]. For words, there was no significant
effect.
In mPFC (Figure 5, middle) for sentences, there was
a Condition × Hemisphere interaction [F(1, 15) = 17.73,
p = .001]. Negative sentences led to more activations
than neutral sentences in both hemispheres [left: F(1,
15) = 67.55, p < .0001; right: F(1, 15) = 33.31, p <
.0001], and such difference was greater in the right than
in the left hemisphere. For words, there was also a Con-
dition × Hemisphere interaction [F(1, 15) = 10.42,
p = .006]. The negative > neutral difference in the right
mPFC was larger than that in the left. Within each hemi-
sphere, there was, however, no main effect of condition
[left: F(1, 15) = 1.55, p = .23; right: F < 1].
For the insula (Figure 5, bottom), we obtained a
Condition × Hemisphere interaction [F(1, 15) = 6.45,
p = .02]. Pairwise comparisons indicate that the ac-
tivation level was higher for negative than for neutral
sentences, but only in the left hemisphere [F(1, 15) =
14.71, p = .002]. For words, no significant effect was
found.
Figure 3. Conjunction analysis of the negative > neutral contrast in
sentences, words, and pictures. All activations are corrected for multiple
comparisons as described in the Methods section ( p < .05).
Figure 4. Mean activations for
neutral (dark gray bars) and
negative (light gray bars)
sentences and words for IFC
pars orbitalis (top), IFC pars
triangularis (middle), and IFC
pars orbitalis (bottom) in the
left hemisphere (left column)
and the right hemisphere
(right column).
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DISCUSSION
This study is one of the first studies that investigated the
brain regions for the comprehension of implied emotion
in sentences. Participants read negative sentences without
negative words, for example, “The boy fell asleep and
never woke up again,” and their neutral counterparts
“The boy stood up and grabbed his bag.” This kind of
negative sentence allows us to examine implied emotion
derived at the sentence level, without associative emotion
coming from word retrieval. We found that implied emo-
tion led to activations in emotion-related areas including
the amygdala, insula, and mPFC. In addition, we found
that implied emotion also led to increased activation in
language-related areas including the IFG. No activation
in the motor areas was observed.
Regions for Implied Emotion in Sentences
The most pronounced activation in sentences is within the
mPFC, which is also the activation overlap across the three
stimulus formats examined in the current study. There are
at least three functional interpretations. First, the mPFC
has been implicated in general emotion processing (Lane
et al., 1997). The finding that all three stimulus formats
have led to activations in the mPFC is consistent with this
proposal. Adding to this literature, we showed that the
mPFC is involved not only in associative emotion in words
and pictures but also in implied emotion in sentences.
Within the mPFC, the activation for the implied emotion
in our negative sentences was more dorsal than ventral.
This is in line with past studies reporting larger signal
changes in the dorsal than the ventral mPFC when partici-
pants interpreted the same stimuli (faces) as being nega-
tively valenced as opposed to being positively valenced
(Kim, Somerville, Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2003).
Second, the mPFC has been implicated in the cognitive
aspect of emotion processing. Implied emotion in sen-
tences requires combinations of words and therefore is
likely to be more cognitively costly than retrieving emotion
explicitly associated with words, as reflected by the greater
mPFC activation in sentences than in words. With regard
to the subdivision of the mPFC for mentalizing, it has been
shown that the ventral mPFC is more involved in the eval-
uative judgments about self, whereas the dorsal mPFC is
more involved in mentalizing about others (Denny, Kober,
Wager, & Ochsner, 2012). This fits our observation of the
dorsal mPFC activation in sentences, as our sentences con-
tain no first person pronouns and are always about the
sufferings of others. Future studies can manipulate the
first/third person pronouns in sentences with implied
emotion to further verify this interpretation.
Third, a number of language studies, the mPFC has
been implicated in inferential processes such as causal
inferencing (Ferstl, 2010; Kuperberg et al., 2006; Ferstl &
von Cramon, 2002), indirect speech (van Ackeren et al.,
2012), and conversational implicatures (Bašnáková et al.,
2014). Thus, the observed activation in the mPFC could
be driven by general inferential processing. This inter-
pretation would suggest that more inferential processing
was needed for the condition with implied meaning than
the one without, rendering the output of the inferential
Figure 5. Mean activations
for neutral (dark gray bars)
and negative (light gray bars)
sentences and words for
amygdala (top), medial
prefrontal cortex (middle),
and insula (bottom) in the
left hemisphere (left column)
and the right hemisphere
(right column).
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processing (emotion, in this case) not crucial as a function
of the mPFC. Although this is possible, it is unlikely, as the
mPFC is found in the vast majority of emotion studies. In
addition, in the current study, the amount of nonemotional
inferential processing was matched between conditions
(cf. Materials). A more likely scenario is that the implied
meaning was jointly output via inferential processing in
mPFC in addition to the core language combinatorial pro-
cessing in areas such as LIFG. After all, successful commu-
nication requires both coded meaning and speaker
meaning.
A second prominent activation is found in the insula
for implied emotion in sentences, but not in words or
pictures. The insula is important for social emotion such
as compassion and empathy (Lamm & Singer, 2010). The
insula activation we observed may reflect our readers’
compassionate/empathizing feelings about the scenarios
described in the sentences. This latter interpretation is
consistent with Willems et al. (2011), who found activa-
tion in the left anterior insula for fearful relative to neutral
captions without scenes. They suggested that their par-
ticipants “feel along” with the implied meaning of the
fearful captions and that the insula is involved when
explicit attention is drawn to emotion (Singer, Critchley,
& Preuschoff, 2009).
A third prominent activation for implied emotion in
sentences is found in the amygdala. This is not surprising
given that our negative sentences were rated more arous-
ing than the neutral ones and that past research has
shown that amygdala responds to the arousing dimen-
sion of the stimuli (cf. Adolphs et al., 1999). An interest-
ing next question is whether implied emotion could be
more arousing than sentences that convey emotion ex-
plicitly. This is an empirical question, but we suspect that
this is probably not necessarily the case, at least not
based on comparing the present data with the one study
that found amygdalar responses for sentences with ex-
plicit emotion (Moll et al., 2002; Holt et al., 2011).
Regions for Associative Emotion in Words
and Pictures
For words, the only area more activated for the negative
relative to neutral words is the mPFC, which has been
shown before in a number of studies on emotional words
(Herbert et al., 2009; Cato et al., 2004; Tabert et al.,
2001). Relating to the mentalizing function in the mPFC,
our results indicate that reading negative words requires
more cognitive processing of emotion than neutral
words. However, no activation in amygdala is observed,
although the valence/arousal difference between the neg-
ative and neutral words has been matched to be the same
as that in the sentences (Table 2). The lack of amygdala
activation may be due to the nonevaluative nature of
our passive reading task, which would be consistent with
the literature that so far only studies that employed an
evaluative task on words found amygdalar responses
(cf. Introduction). However, this cannot account for the
amygdala activation that we observed for the emotional
sentences, because they were read passively as well. We
contend that emotional language can lead to activation in
amygdala, but only when there is sufficient context in-
cluding both the speaker context (task/processing goal)
and the sentential context that might make the emotional
information salient and noticeable.
In pictures, negative pictures led to more activation in
the bilateral amygdala and mPFC relative to neutral
words, findings that are typically observed in emotion re-
search. There was also enhanced activation in IFG and
middle temporal gyrus (MTG). It is not uncommon to ob-
serve activation in IFG in imaging studies of emotional
scenes (Vytal & Hamann, 2010). The IFG and MTG are
also commonly implicated in language studies. It is pos-
sible that our participants made up stories for the scenar-
ios depicted in the pictures internally, leading to some
verbal processing. The latter explanation is supported
by the ROI analyses, which showed that both pars trian-
gularis and pars orbitalis are involved, which are usually
regarded as nodes in the language processing network
(Hagoort, 2005, 2013). It should be noted that the latter
interpretation was constructed post hoc, because we had
no a priori expectation that participants would engage in
more verbalization in the negative as compared to the
neutral condition.
Regions for Combinatorial Processing in Sentences
Implied emotion in sentences enhanced activation in the
RIFG and bilateral MTG in the whole-brain analysis and
bilateral IFG in the ROI analysis. These areas are known
to be critical for language processing, with an especially
important contribution of left and right IFG to combina-
torial operations in language. Through these operations,
sentence level meaning is constructed from the mean-
ings of the individual lexical items. Crucially, in our sen-
tence condition, the emotional content was not due to
the meaning of the individual words but resulted fully
from the combinatorial operations that created the over-
all sentence meaning, with, in our case, an emotional
quality.
The coactivation of these language-relevant areas sug-
gests that the emotion network is intricately connected
with the processing in the left and right IFG. As concerns
right IFG, previous studies have found that increased
combinatorial processing leads to increased activation
in the right IFG, especially for stimuli consisting of brief
discourse (Ferstl, 2010; Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems,
2009; Menenti, Petersson, Scheeringa, & Hagoort,
2009). Within the subdivisions of the left IFG, enhanced
activations in pars orbitalis and pars triangularis were
found, but not in pars opercularis. Thus, implied emotion
in visual sentences recruit the pars orbitalis and pars tri-
angularis, most likely for the semantic and the syntactic
processing that they support, respectively (Hagoort,
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2005). The left IFG and other language areas might be
gain-modulated by the emotional content of the sen-
tences as a result of its relevance for the organism as a
whole. That is, information from the emotion network
feeds back into the language network to increase the
level of lexical activations and combinatorial operations,
given the relevance of the emotional content.
Activations in some unpredicted regions were found.
First, the negative > neutral contrast in sentences led
to activation in the left precuneus. The precuneus has
been implicated in self-centered imagery and episodic
memory retrieval (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Perhaps
the participants imagined themselves in the described
situation more in the negative than in the neutral con-
ditions. Second, the neutral > negative contrast in sen-
tences led to activation in the right superior frontal
sulcus. The right superior frontal sulcus has been impli-
cated in the maintenance of information (Taylor et al.,
2004). It could be that the neutral sentences require
more working memory for information maintenance than
negative sentences because of the lack of emotional sig-
nificance in the neutral sentences. Given that we did not
have a priori hypotheses about these unexpected find-
ings, our interpretations here remain speculations.
Finally, the present findings have implications for
embodied theories of emotion. We did not find any in-
volvement of the motor regions, which suggests that
not all types of emotional meaning must rely on simula-
tion in the motor regions and that implied emotion can
be the result of combinatorial operations, a result that
cannot be explained in terms of a Hebbian cell assembly
of neurons coding for the linguistic elements and their
emotional valence.
Reprint requests should be sent to Vicky Tzuyin Lai, Department
of Psychology, University of South Carolina, 1512 Pendleton
Street, Columbia, SC 29208, or via e-mail: vicky.tzuyin.lai@
gmail.com.
Notes
1. It is possible to dissociate combinatorial processing and
inferential processing. It is possible to combine words to gen-
erate a new sentence without generating an inference, and it is
possible to generate an inference without combining words to
generate a new sentence.
2. Although we did not intend to selectively test female par-
ticipants, after excluding bad participants the majority is female.
It is possible that gender plays a role in the processing of implied
emotion, which is an interesting issue for future investigation.
3. See Kuperberg et al. (2006) for another way of verifying
inferences.
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